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Abstract
The institution of chieftaincy is one of the most enduring 
traditional institutions of Africa in spite of the many 
vicissitudes it displayed remarkable resilience from 
colonial through post-colonial times. Historically, 
chiefs constituted the axis for the exercise of executive, 
legislative, judicial, military, economic and religious 
roles. Although chieftaincy institution has experienced 
ebbs and flows depending on regime preferences and 
dynamic changes since independence, Chiefs and 
traditional institutions have manipulated their legitimacy 
to entrench itself. It is argued that despite assertions that 
chieftaincy has been overtaken by events, the reality is 
that the institution has become central to government 
and cannot be discarded. The challenges of recent times, 
has raised serious concerns about the importance of 
chieftaincy against the backdrop of the institution’s 
ambiguous role in modern times. This study traces 
the historical roles of chiefs, and the inscriptive, non-
democratic and anti-modern character of the institution 
which some pessimist believe would not guarantee its 
survival in the face of “modernization.”
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The notion of “chieftaincy” evokes a political system 
always understood and legitimized as being founded 
on the principle of “traditional” customs, and values. 
Remarkably, this institution has flourished among 
Bekwarra people and is presided over by a traditional 
ruler who by virtue of his ancestry occupies the throne or 
stool of the community in accordance with the customs 
and tradition of the people. Three categories of traditional 
title holders are identified among the Bekwarra people. 
The first category is those who hold titles conferred on 
them by superior traditional rulers in appreciation for 
their contributions in community development. Those so 
conferred have neither political enclave nor authority to 
enforce laws on any group of people. Whatever degrees 
of respect, prestige and power or status accruing to them 
is such that they, in the first instance, worked for it, and 
secondly, must work to sustain their individual relevance 
and continued acceptance or else go into the oblivion.
(Ukpokolo, 2009, pp.9-10)
 In the second category are holders of titles as a result 
of recent recognition of such positions. They may have 
some executive functions, but these executive functions 
are defined and restricted by the same laws that created 
them. These examples are replete in Cross River State and 
some southern parts of Nigeria where, through Edicts, 
chieftaincy titles were created or formal recognition was 
given to titles that existed before but not long enough for 
them to have generated and commanded veneration and 
respect without the help and sanction of Edicts. The third 
category consists of full time traditional title holders who 
derive their executive functions from traditions and are 
simply referred to as traditional rulers. In spite of this 
categorization, all three play complementary roles and have 
the welfare of their subjects as their primary responsibility.
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This chapter, African Culture and Tradition at the 
Crossroad: The Institution of Chieftaincy and the Paradox 
of Modernity in Bekwarra is divided into three parts 
viz: pre modern, early modern and modern periods. This 
demarcation is intended to present historical development 
of the institution and a springboard for assessing the 
transformations that have occurred. This chapter argues 
that although in the pre modern era, traditional leaders 
gave effect to traditional life and played an essential role 
in the day-to-day administration of their areas and lives 
of traditional people, the early modern and modern period 
witnessed a systematic but gradual adulteration of the 
institution and loose of power by chiefs. 
1.  INSTITUTION OF CHIEFTAINCY IN 
PRE MODERN BEKWARRA 
Bekwarra political institutions prior to the advent of the 
British were predicated on a solid structure of institutions 
organically related to one another. These institutions, 
most of which were fashioned out of the social structure 
of the society have been the embodiment of unity and 
tradition. The institution of chieftaincy having grown out 
of the consensus of elders at the birth of the society has 
consistently thrived as a highly revered institution that 
was largely symbolized by a chief. Bekwarra Chiefs as 
‘embodiment of local custom’ and icons of honor had their 
position guided by specific institutionalized traditions 
with respect to accession to office and performance of 
functions. The office often resided in specific lineages 
that were genealogically linked to the founding ancestors. 
(Omagu, 1997)
It should perhaps be stated here that once a man was 
installed a chief, he occupied the position for life. It 
was only on event of grievous wrong doing that led to 
banishment, dethronement or death another chief was 
installed. Indeed, customary rules of succession are 
primarily designed to perpetuate a bloodline and as such, 
if a stool is declared vacant, the onus rested on the council 
of elders to produce the most appropriate successor to the 
throne from a pool of the deceased’s sons. In instances 
where no qualified successor to the throne is found among 
the deceased chief’s children, the position is rotated 
within a particular ward; (Ikah) has legitimate right to 
the throne. In Bekwarra, before the option of rotation 
among family unit is explored in the absence of a son to 
the throne, other family members who are of the royal 
family are sort for. Indeed, to fill a vacant stool in cases 
where there are multiple candidates for the position, the 
kingmaker’s exercised great judiciousness; wisdom as well 
as the personal qualities which among other things will 
include honesty; integrity and tolerance were given serious 
attention. It was however, not uncommon for an heir to 
the throne to decline taking up the responsibility. Although 
this happens on few occasions the reasons was probably 
hinged on the fact that traditionally in Bekwarra, chiefs 
participated in an incredible number of elaborate rituals, 
and regulated all religious ceremonies as well as sacrifices 
to the gods. So a chosen successor who was opposed to the 
performance of the rituals attached to the title may decline 
the office and proceed on self-exile to an undisclosed 
location to avoid being abducted and crowned.
The process of investiture of a chief under the 
practice of gerontocracy as was the case in Bekwarra 
was complex, ritualistic and interminable. Once chosen, 
by the king-makers, the matter was expected to remain 
secret so as to ensure that that the chosen candidate never 
absconded. After the seizure of the candidate, he was kept 
in seclusion for seven days under the care and protection 
of an appointed individual. The chief however, was never 
so accepted until he went successfully through the seven 
days period of seclusion and lying on a traditional bed 
known as “Anwia”. This practice is symbolic because 
traditionally, it proved the eligibility of the candidate 
because if he is not the choice of the gods, he is expected 
to die on top of the “Anwia”. 
After seven days, he came out fully dressed in his 
regalia, usually a long thick cloth called Igbagiri, a red 
cap, a noisy traditional rod Unachi, and Ugbe Ushie, 
a neck worn around the neck as well as some charms 
that made up his paraphernalia of royal office. (Omagu, 
1997) At the formal investiture, a series of injunctions 
publicly recited before the new chief defines his political 
authority and the political relationship that is expected 
to be maintained between him and his subjects (Gekeye, 
1997). He enjoyed a large measure of privileges. Among 
these are that all his farm work were done for him by the 
community; he was also entitled to the ham of certain 
animals killed during individual and group hunting, 
his compound was constructed and maintained by the 
community. On the other hand, a chief was surrounded by 
many taboos. Chiefs are barred from going to the market, 
carry load on their head, and eat at the market square, they 
were also forbidden from seeing human blood, a corpse, 
as well as a grave and a new born baby, fight or strike 
even his own child. Generally, Bekwarra chiefs are adored 
by the people and as such acting contrary to demands 
of traditions, which could incur punishment from the 
gods. The chief on his part was expected to reciprocate 
this respect and power accorded him by ensuring the 
prosperity of his subjects and domain. In order to sustain 
this, the common cultural attributes of chiefs are preserved 
as part of their ancestral heritage―and this is a major 
obligation of traditional leaders. 
Chiefs as political head are rallying points for 
development in the community. Through a chief’s office, 
his subjects were mobilized to assist in projects that 
position the community into serving the needs of its 
member’s well-being. Such projects may include but 
not restricted to clearing bushy areas of the community, 
building of markets, roads, and providing security. In 
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this respect, the institution first and foremost becomes 
a focal establishment for uniting community members 
and promoting a sense of belonging among people in 
rural communities. Conventionally, a chief has powers 
to declare war and make peace, conclude alliances, send 
and receive emissaries, appoints subordinate officials and 
is also the final arbiter in the administration of justice. 
Indeed, the Institution of chieftaincy held sway as the 
organizational structure around which the socio-political, 
cultural, and economic life of the people revolved. Such 
powers as possessed by chiefs and conferred on them by 
tradition were obtainable in other African societies. 
The institution functioned as the political and 
administrative center of governance for traditional 
communities. The village assembly represented the largest 
and very powerful organ of government in the village 
polity that the chief worked closely with in carrying out 
his duties. Important civil disputes were dealt with by 
an ad-hoc town meeting held when the need arose.  The 
spokesman of the village council - Idengeli summoned 
meetings of the council on the instruction of the chief 
through the town crier who disseminated the invitation 
by beating a drum or hitting of a gong. These meetings 
were usually held at the market square, playground or in 
the chief’s compound. Here, the elders in the community 
laid specific issues concerning the unit before the people. 
Every man had the right to speak, oppose or accept 
any issue brought before them. Popular proposals were 
naturally applauded and unpopular ones shouted down. 
(Omagu, 1997).
Historically, the institution of traditional leadership 
played a vital role in the body politic of pre-colonial 
African communities. It embodies the preservation of 
culture, traditions, customs and values of the African 
people, while also representing the early forms of societal 
organization and governance.(Department of Justice 
and Constitutional Development,) In recognition of the 
fact that people entrusted with power are capable of 
political tyranny, to borrow a phrase from John Emerich 
Edward Dalberg Acton, “Power tends to corrupt, and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely, great men are almost 
always bad men”, the council of elders provided efficient 
checks and balances on a chief’s functions and power 
to safeguard against abuse of power. Viewed from the 
perspective of contemporary democracy, the formal 
mechanisms of accountability in African traditional 
institutions were rather weak, since chiefs often combined 
both executive as well as judicial powers and the councils, 
were often composed largely of members of the nobility 
or close relatives of the chiefs (Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development).
The chief ’s council (Ikem Udiara) in Bekwarra 
like most African societies was composed mostly of 
male heads of different family units. They served as 
advisers and met periodically to formulate policies and 
take decisions on village matters. Indeed these people 
were generally seen as a “committee of wise men” who 
possessed the innate ability to understand the intricacies 
of human organization. Prominent among the elders was 
the Idengeli, chosen on account of his personal qualities, 
such as, imposing and commanding personality, oratory, 
knowledge of the community law and custom. 
The council is presided over by the chief and he 
is obliged to act on the advice and with the consent 
of his councilors, whom he has to summon regularly. 
The councilors freely discuss all matters affecting the 
community and, in any such atmosphere of free and frank 
expression of opinions, disagreements are inevitable. 
But in the event of such disagreements, the council 
would continue to listen to arguments until a consensus 
was reached with the reconciliation of opposed views. 
(Senyonjo) The councilors and the people had a symbiotic 
relationship and as such no important decision was passed 
by the councilors without first consulting the people. 
The government’s decision-making process was not far 
removed from the people. And since the people were 
involved throughout much of the process, the decisions 
taken by the councilors were most likely to be endorsed by 
the community as legitimately representing their interests. 
The active participation of the community in its own 
political affairs was not new in traditional Africa where 
elders would sit and discuss clan or state affairs in open 
view of everyone. Such participation and ownership of 
the political system is arguably the essence of democracy. 
(Senyonjo) This point is further buttressed by Meyer 
Fortes, and E.E. Evans-Pritchard who opine that: “the 
structure of an African State implies that kings and chiefs 
rule by consent. A ruler’s subjects are as fully aware of the 
duties he owes to them as they are of duties they owe to 
him, and are able to exert pressure to make him discharge 
his duties” (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard, 1940, p.12).
Bekwarra laws, like those of most non-literate 
societies, were unwritten and based on legal interdictions 
promulgated by rulers or arising from general disapproval, 
and taboos which depended on a magico-religious 
sanction. Thus besides civil prohibitions, there were 
also religious and ecclesiastical inhibitions. But because 
there was no hard and fast division between the two, it 
is difficult to say where the former ended and the latter 
began. A very strong sense of justice prevailed among all 
ethnic groups, perhaps because the mystical connection 
between kings and their people meant that their prosperity 
depended on justice and due observance of the laws and 
taboos. No difference was made between the executive 
and judicial powers, as they were combined in the chief 
ruler, or rulers, of the people (Adejumobi, 2000, p.156).
The process of dealing with offenders was based on 
a hierarchical structure that had procedural guidelines. 
For offences committed within a family the matter was 
heard and determined by the family head. However, if a 
family head was unable to resolve a matter he would call 
upon the clan elders to adjudicate the matter (Kinyanjui, 
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n.d). Similarly, if the offender and the victim belonged 
to the same clan, the council of elders in that clan would 
adjudicate the matter. (Kinyanjui, n.d) Once a case is 
reported to the village head, he consults with other elders 
in the village and then sets a day for the hearing of the 
case. Both the plaintiff and the defendant are asked to 
deposit a certain amount of money which is then shared 
by the presiding elders. On the appointed day, litigants 
appeared before the elders and other participants who 
listen to their presentation. The presiding elder outlines 
the expected decorum and fines for violators and then asks 
the plaintiff to present his/her case. After the presentation, 
the plaintiff is aggressively and thoroughly questioned, 
by the defendant, elders and members of the audience 
present. Witnesses were called and their testimonies 
strictly scrutinized through questioning. Both the offender 
and the victim would have a spokesperson from his or her 
family to represent the facts to the clan elders. In an inter-
clan matter, where the offender and the victim belonged to 
different clans, elders from the different clans would come 
together. Spokespersons to represent each clan would then 
be selected to facilitate the hearing of evidence from both 
sides (Kinyanjui, n.d). Cases not concluded in one day are 
adjourned. Elders decision are based on oral evidence and 
facts presented before it. 
It may however be appropriate to discuss some 
important modes and means of settlements of disputes as 
employed by Bekwarra judicial system. Indeed traditional 
Bekwarra justice was tested in a number of areas.
Stealing is abhorred and it is in fact, an abomination 
to steal things relating to people’s vital life-interests 
and occupation, like agricultural products or animals 
caught in a snare laid by a hunter or farmer in the bushes. 
Indeed thieves are treated with the severity their crimes 
deserve. The penalties usually focus on compensation or 
restitution in order to restore the status quo, rather than 
punishment. (Merry, 1982, p.17-45) However, sometimes 
traditional justice forums may order the restitution, for 
example, twice the number of the stolen goods to their 
owner, “especially when the offender has been caught 
in flagrante delicto” and fines may be levied. (Elias, 
1969, p.20; MINARS (Ministry of Social Assistance and 
Rehabilitation of Angola, 1984, p.94).
For boundary dispute or trespass, the Bekwarra sense 
of justice is brought to bear by way of traditional history 
and adjudicated over by family heads, or expressed in 
terms of litigation before the chief and elders. In the olden 
days when the use of modern day beacons was unknown, 
boundaries were demarcated by the use of some economic 
trees like palm trees and coconut trees which can survive 
the adverse effects of various weathers. In land disputes, 
what is therefore just is identified with the goodness of the 
title and correspondence with boundary. It should be stated 
here that a dispute cannot be settled unless the victim, 
as well as the offender agree with the final decision. For 
the elders to be sure that genuine reconciliation has been 
achieved after dispute mediation, both parties may be 
expected to eat from the same bowl, drink palm wine, or 
local gin from the same cup and/or break and eat kola-
nuts. This forms part of the reconciliatory approach 
intrinsic to most African traditional dispute mediation. 
The public also partake in the eating and drinking as an 
expression of the communal element inherently present 
in any individual conflict and of their acceptance of the 
offender back into the community (Omale, 2006).
Bekwarra chiefs presided over communal strife 
resulting from land/boundary disputes, murder of a member 
of a particular town, feuds for farm lands, as well as market 
quarrels. Resolution of issues of conflicts took the form of 
negotiation and plea bargaining between the two towns. 
Often, representations of men recognized for their wealth 
of knowledge, closeness to power, or the performance of 
some important religious duties (Falola, 2000, p.32) from 
the two towns would meet to deliberate on the issue. At the 
end justice is done in terms of compensation, reparation, 
apology, and payment of damages 
In crimes like murder, considered to have dislocative 
and destructive impact on the society (Adejumobi, p.155) 
utmost care and evidence relating to the charge was 
critically analyzed and any iota of doubt observed was 
resolved in favor of the accused. However, where all 
available evidence pointed incriminatingly at the accused, 
no amount of plea could save him/her from the full wrath 
of the law. Murder, called for atonement, propitiation of 
gods or ancestors and punishment which was as severe 
as banishment or even the death sentence (Adejumobi, 
p.155). Whatever approach is adopted, first the moral 
pollution has to be cleansed in order to appease spiritual 
beings and ancestors who are believed to have been also 
offended without which the entire community stood a real 
and imminent danger of suffering a disaster. 
Belief in witchcraft is widespread across Africa. It 
is the explanation for otherwise inexplicable misfortune 
among people who are looking for personalized causes. 
(Omale, April, 2009) Accused witches can be men or 
women, young. Men and women accused of practicing 
witchcraft are brought before the chief’ court and tried 
either through oath taking or appeal to god or supernatural 
forces. Considerable wisdom was displayed by the Chief 
and his council in deciding cases in which no element of 
witchcraft or other belief repugnant to modern feelings 
enter. It is most probable that the right decision is 
given with as much certainty as in a European court”. 
(Fisiy, p.264). Suspects certified guilty of witchcraft 
are stigmatized, discriminated against for life and stood 
irrevocably condemned to whatever penalties the law 
prescribed. (Omagu, 1997) The fate of witches was 
death or perpetual exile, the former being, in fact, the 
lesser alternative. (Shorter, 1977, p.32-51) For most 
African groups, ostracizing an individual or group that 
has fragrantly disobeyed the community is thought to be 
the most severe punishment that could be meted out to 
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anybody. It feels like death for any one so punished since 
such a person is regarded as an outcast. He/She would not 
be allowed to share in the life of the community anymore. 
There would be no visits to the family, no exchange of 
greetings, no one would sell or buy from members of the 
affected family, and may not be allowed to fetch water 
from community streams. So severe is the punishment 
of ostracisation that every member of the community 
highly dreads it, and would do everything possible to 
avoid it. It does, on the other hand, show the kind of 
tremendous power of the community in traditional African 
background. Sometimes, victims accused of witchcraft 
are subjected to psychological and physical violence, 
either by family members and their circle of friends, or 
traditional healers. 
Indeed, the penalties ordained by the laws may be 
said to have been imposed partly as a deterrent, partly 
in revenge, and partly because the crimes were thought 
unpleasing to the gods and ancestors. The punishment 
varied according to how the crime was regarded either 
as an offense against community law, priest, chiefs or 
age grade and club laws (Omagu, 1997). On the whole, 
Bekwarra laws appeared to have been sensible and the 
penalties were mild when compared with most pre-
colonial laws; they were harsh according to modern 
European standards. Sir James Marshall’s testimony as 
to the efficiency of the West African pre-colonial justice 
system is important here. According to him:
… These people have their own laws and customs, which are 
better adapted to their condition than the complicated system 
of English jurisprudence. The adoption of them would, it is 
maintained, be more conducive to the best interests of all than 
the present system. (Balonwu, 1975, p.31- 67).
The main thrust of traditional Bekwarra justice system 
is often to bring closure to disputes between people living 
in the same community, based on restoration and who 
will have to live and work together in future. Braithwaite, 
for example, asserts that “restorative justice has been 
the dominant model of criminal justice throughout 
most of human history for perhaps the entire world’s 
peoples”. (Braithwaite, 2002) Its emphasis, according 
to Armstrong et al, is on the “processes of achieving 
peaceful resolutions of disputes rather than on adherence 
to rules as the basis of determining disputes”.( Armstrong, 
et al, 1993, p.14). A fair and just judgment must take into 
account a wider range of facts and interests, including 
that of the community, without necessarily compromising 
the facts of the matter in dispute and the rights of the 
litigants. Nsereko notes that African customary legal 
processes “focused mainly on the victim rather than on 
the offender”. (Nsereko, 1992, p.22). The goal of justice 
was to vindicate the victim and protect his/her rights. The 
imposition of punishment on the offender was designed 
to bring about the healing of the victim rather than to 
punish the offender. In any conflict, rather than punish the 
offender for punishment sake, the offender was made to 
pay compensation to the victim. Compensation according 
to Nsereko goes beyond restitution. It also represents a 
form of apology and atonement by the offender to the 
victim and the community (Nsereko, 1992, p.22).
In the determination of any charge against a person, 
professional legal representation is not a feature of the 
traditional justice system, nor can it be regarded as 
required. Indeed with traditional justice system, decisions 
can be delivered more promptly and financial costs 
involved for litigants, are minimal (Stevens, 2000). The 
importance of traditional courts derives from the fact 
that proceedings are quick and take place within walking 
distance. They are also conducted in the local language 
and carried out in a manner which everyone understands 
by people who are socially important to litigants, 
rather than impersonal state officials. (Stevens, 2000) 
Traditional justice is inherently flexible and can adjust 
to changing circumstances more easily. Although not 
mandatory, family participation in the legal proceedings 
was an important feature of the Bekwarra justice system. 
The involvement of the families of the wrongdoer and 
wronged party reaffirmed the communal ties. Having in 
mind that individual conduct had repercussions on one’s 
kin; individuals bore the responsibility to act properly. 
Therefore this social structure, which was based on 
communal living, facilitated the operation of restorative 
justice (Kinyanjui, n.d).
In pre-colonial Bekwarra, imprisonment did not 
exist as a penalty for any offence. Corporal punishment, 
however, has been and continues to be administered 
by a number of traditional systems in Africa―almost 
invariably on juvenile offenders, but never on women 
or girls. (Elias, 1956, p.288) Such offenders are isolated 
and despised by their peers and the community at large, 
but a habitual criminal who has consistently manifested a 
propensity for stealing is banished from the community. It 
is however, only after several attempts by the community 
to restore order by employing corrective action has failed 
would an offender be banished from the community―this 
would be a last resort where an offender did not attempt 
to mend her/his ways. Public consensus is necessary to 
ensure enforcement of the decision. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that the procedures used in traditional systems 
allow members of the public to tender evidence and 
generally make their opinions known (Allott, 1968, p.146).
The vast majority of norms, taboos and prohibitions 
are directed towards protecting the community as well 
as promoting peace and harmony. Communal farmland, 
economic interests like the market-place, stream, or shrine 
are generally surrounded with taboos, including who may 
or may not enter, and when, and under what circumstances 
people are permitted or not to enter such places. There are 
also special restrictions and norms regulating the behavior 
of people towards public functionaries like lineage 
heads, the king or queen, traditional priests, diviners 
and medicine-practitioners. Such persons are generally 
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
African Culture and Tradition at the Crossroad: The Institution 
of Chieftaincy and the Paradox of Modernity in Bekwarra
6
regarded as specially sacred, and representative of the 
community. Their residence is equally sacred so, are 
instruments of their office (Ejizu).
The institution therefore symbolizes stability. It is 
through this legal role that the traditions, norms and 
values of his community are validated and transmitted. 
The powers, roles and functions of traditional leaders 
were defined in terms of customary law. It was through 
this framework that the traditional political institution 
in Bekwarra functioned and was not as claimed by the 
European’s that the traditional system lacked cohesion 
and was inundated with disorder and confusion. Indeed, 
Bekwarra institution of chieftaincy in the pre modern 
period exhibited democratic norms of governance, justice 
and checks and balances. Such values were to be found in 
many traditional institutions elsewhere in Africa. The next 
part, will examine the early modern period and the impact 
of the institution of chieftaincy in Bekwarra.
2.  INSTITUTION OF CHIEFTAINCY IN 
EARLY MODERN BEKWARRA 
It must be noted that the defining contact between 
Africa and the West dates back to the slave trade era 
immediately followed by the formal colonization of the 
continent whereby, the Europeans implemented various 
political, economic, and social policies that enabled them 
to maintain or extend their authority and control over 
different territories in Africa. 
The establishment of a regular administration in 
Nigeria began with the appointment of Sir Claude 
Macdonald as consul in 1891 with the mandate to 
consolidate the territories and bring them under a uniform 
system of government (Omagu, 1997). Later in 1900, 
these areas, together with those hitherto controlled by 
the Royal Niger Company, were amalgamated to become 
the protectorate of Southern Nigeria with headquarters at 
Calabar. In 1906, the colony of Lagos and the protectorate 
of Southern Nigeria were merged.  The creation of 
three provinces, viz: Western, Central and Eastern with 
headquarters at Lagos, Warri and Calabar respectively 
attended this new development. Significantly, 1914 
witnessed another administrative shake-up with the three 
provinces of the south becoming nine.  Four of these 
situated East of the Niger included Onitsha, Owerri, 
Calabar and Ogoja each of which was split into districts. 
(Afigbo, 1980, p.415).
The penetration of the colonial force into Ogoja 
province was followed by the subjugation of the 
inhabitants of the area including Bekwarra (Tamuno, 
1972, p.44). According to Talbot, the conquest of the 
country between the Cross River and the Northern Nigeria 
boundary completed by the military force under colonel 
Trenchard resulted in a wide extension of government 
jurisdictions and control of Ogoja including Bekwarra and 
Ikom districts (Talbot, 1926). On 13th March, 1908, Hives, 
the acting divisional commissioner for Ogoja province 
arrived to assume charge over the area and later that year, 
he paid a courtesy visit to Bekwarra (Omagu, 1997, p.145).
As expansive territories were being brought under 
colonial control in Nigeria and other territories, the British 
were faced with cost and logistical issues associated with 
colonial administration. It was therefore not surprising 
that the colonialists who came to impose their own 
social order on the indigenous existing nationalities 
that later coalesced into the present day Nigeria, found 
it expedient to enlist the support and cooperation of 
traditional rulers in securing their hold on the conquered 
territories. To administer their colonies effectively, the 
British government introduced the policy of indirect rule 
(Department of Chieftaincy Affairs). 
For the British, indirect rule, which had been applied 
successfully in Northern Nigeria, was the most expedient 
method for local administration in British colonies where 
the existing indigenous state systems had recognizable, 
organized, well-structured political and administrative 
hierarchies. Indeed, traditional rulers proved so 
indispensable in this regard that where none seemed to 
have existed, the colonialists appointed same as in the case 
of the warrant chief in some parts of the former Eastern 
Region of Nigeria (Department of Chieftaincy Affairs).
The introduction of the Warrant Chiefs (among 
other policies), undermined the powers of the chiefs. It 
re-arranged the political terrain by introducing a new 
organizational superstructure. This new order, which the 
Warrant Chiefs signified, created a new socio-political 
climate in which uncontrollable deceit, extortion’s and 
various forms of corruption held sway. Unlike in the 
traditional society where decisions were reached in the 
presence of the community and anchored on accepted 
customs, the Warrant Chiefs operated under a different 
system characterized by surreptitiousness. They were 
accountable only to the colonial officer and not to the 
people or community. Once the colonial officer was happy 
with them, then they needed not border about their people. 
Due to the manner of their selection, these public officers 
themselves never felt any loyalty or responsibility to their 
own people (Isichei, 1976, p.145).
The Warrant Chiefs took undue advantage of the 
authorities bestowed upon them by the colonizers and the 
linguistic barriers between the people and the colonizers. 
Within a few years the appointed Warrant Chiefs became 
increasingly oppressive.  They seized property, imposed 
draconian local regulations, and began imprisoning 
anyone who openly criticized them. Justice in the case 
of settling disputes became a commodity to be sold to 
the highest bidder.(Afigbo, 1972, p.316; Isichei, 1976, 
p.145; Afigbo, 1981, p.316). In effect, many Warrant 
Chiefs solely constituted colonially-backed usurpers of 
power and had little legitimacy beyond the fact of their 
being installed by the colonial state. Nonetheless, they 
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held power and used it for their own gain. Their main 
source of power was the control of Native Courts and 
of labor, for example, for colonial road and waterway 
construction (Ofonagoro, 1982, p.219-243). With such 
illicit funds they acquired, they lived a life high above the 
entire community. They built zinc houses; storey building 
and their children were able to acquire western education 
within and outside the country. Buttressing this statement, 
Isichei, remarked that “of the first Igbo’s who studied 
abroad and fully mastered the skills of the Western world, 
a notable proportion were the sons or close relatives of 
Warrant Chiefs” (Isichei 1976, p.149).
Apart from the modus operandi of the Warrant Chiefs, 
the haphazard and arbitrary style of their selection 
helped to make the whole system as detestable as it was 
despicable. (Isichei 1976, p.143). Their selection did not 
follow a particular order like that of seniority, integrity 
or general acclamation. Most often the colonizers 
imposed a candidate of their will, at times such people 
were social misfits who would work for the interest of 
the British. In response to this disturbing development, 
Bekwarra people started insulting and ridiculing the 
Warrant Chiefs by calling them derogatory names like 
“warrant thieves”, the white men’s slaves, white men’s 
messengers. Notwithstanding, British colonial authorities 
were reluctant either to change them or the system thus 
paving the way for the Women’s war of 1929. It is perhaps 
necessary to add here that the action of these women had 
a domino effect in the whole of Southern Nigeria. Sequel 
to this, successive British administrators instituted a 
number of reforms particularly from 1929 culminating in 
the county council reforms of 1951 (Omagu, 1997, p.145).
An additional measure introduced by the British to 
achieve its imperial design was the establishment of native 
court where members of the community had their disputes 
resolved. With the native courts proclamation of 1900 
and 1906, Bekwarra people fell under the jurisdiction of 
the divisional native court at Ogoja which they attended 
from 1915 till 1927 when a separate session was held 
at Abouchiche, Bekwarra (Omagu, 1997, p.145). The 
establishment of these courts was based on the wrong 
assumption that the groups never had institutions capable 
of settling inter-group disputes, maintaining law and order 
as well as regulate other local matters. These courts not 
only served as tribunals of justice but were also regarded 
as the local executive arms of the central government. 
According to Hailey these courts were vested with 
judicial responsibilities empowered to make laws (with 
the sanction of the Governor), modify any native law 
as required for the peace, good order and welfare of the 
natives in their areas of jurisdiction (Hailey, 1951).
The Warrant Chief system was inseparable from the 
native courts. Hatch, observed that as members of the 
native court, these Warrant Chief wielded full executive 
powers in the respective villages. The District Officer 
dealt almost exclusively with these court members, 
passing all orders to the village through them. They also 
performed such functions as keeping the peace inside the 
towns, turning people out to work on the roads, collecting 
taxes (Hatch, 1969) which were unknown to the people. 
As a matter of fact, the native court and the warrant chiefs 
had taken over the executive, legislative and judicial 
responsibilities of the age grades (Aten), the traditional 
rulers and the council of elders (Ikim Udiara).
In Bekwarra, for instance, it was no longer the 
responsibility of these indigenous institutions to make 
laws or punish offenders who went contrary to these laws. 
These responsibilities had been taken over by the native 
courts; a situation which amounted to introducing foreign 
elements into indigenous system and the destruction 
of the sovereignty of the people of Bekwarra. Forde, 
observed concerning the loss of judicial power by natural 
rulers that, “What would be regarded as civil actions in 
British law such as settlement of debt, criminal charges 
including assault and also breaches of native system 
formerly punished by the native elders in councils were 
all actionable before these courts” (Forde, 1939, p.34).
In retrospect, chiefs made it possible for the colonial 
government to bring immense, often impassable 
territories under their control. They carried additional 
responsibilities of a civic nature, as they were entrusted 
with responsibility for local infrastructural development, 
including agriculture, health, education, and livestock 
farming. Inevitably, as chiefs performed the function of 
“auxiliaries” to the colonial government—as go-between 
linking the two centers of administration—they found 
themselves in an uncomfortable, often unenviable position. 
Their relationship with the seats of colonial administration 
became increasingly ambivalent as they were the object of 
local discontent (Adjaye & Misawa, 2006).
Indeed, the British government undermined the political 
authority of the natural rulers through the native court 
system. The natural rulers were relegated to the background 
becoming mere figure-heads and in some cases ceasing to 
exist and the Warrants Chiefs of the native courts usurped 
their position and authority. The British government, 
however, failed to provide the people of Bekwarra with 
a better alternative since any individual who was able to 
speak English was made Warrant Chief even though he 
had no claims to chieftaincy. Thus, the personality of these 
Warrant Chiefs and their corrupt practices did not inspire 
confidence on the people. It is, therefore, clear that the 
native court system not only constituted a check on the 
political influence of the traditional institutions in Bekwarra 
but also undermined them.
The impact of colonialism on traditional institution in 
Bekwarra, like most African societies, largely transformed 
the form and content of chieftaincy and, thus, the relations 
between chiefs and their communities. The colonial state 
either demoted or eliminated African leaders who resisted 
colonialism or rebelled against it. Leaders who submitted 
to colonial rule were mostly incorporated into the 
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colonial governance structure of indirect rule, which was 
designed to provide the colonial State with a viable low-
cost administrative structure to maintain order, mobilize 
labor, enforce production of cash crops, and collect taxes. 
Indeed, the contemptuous attitude of the British colonial 
administration to traditional rulers was rife as many chiefs 
fell victim to dethronement at the hands of the colonial 
administration and had limited control of land thereby 
making ordinary people to shift their allegiance.(Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA), 2007).
In spite of their precarious position, there has been 
conflicting views about the involvement of traditional 
leaders with the colonial enterprise. Although some 
scholars have contended that chiefs did not view 
themselves as conscious cogs of imperialism, yet the 
ambivalence with which many chiefs were viewed as 
pliant tools in the colonial project cannot be dismissed 
despite the insistence of some observer. On the contrary, 
during the depression years, for example, chiefs and 
their councils were the vehicles by which the colonial 
government made increased demands for exports to offset 
dwindling imperial resources. (Adjaye & Misawa, 2006)
In terms of the chiefs’ power, the 1947 Native 
Authorities Ordinance of Nigeria entrenched their 
increasing diminution in autonomy. Lord Lugard’s 
Political Memorandum of 1907 painted a clear picture of 
the diminished role of the chief, when it cunningly stated 
that “There are no two sets of rulers—British and Native—
working either separately or in cooperation, but a single 
government in which native chiefs have well-defined 
duties and an acknowledged status equally with the British 
Officers. Their duties should never conflict and should 
overlap as little as possible...” (Adjaye & Misawa, 2006).
There is no better place for understanding the limits or 
the lack of chiefly powers in Nigeria under colonialism 
than the constitutional frameworks adopted over a period 
of time, beginning with the Richards Constitution of 
1947 (Adjaye & Misawa, 2006) which greatly reduced 
the constitutional powers of the traditional rulers both at 
the centre and in the regions. While it can be stated that 
Native Authorities’ reforms were attempts to create new 
progressive changes, in reality, they were antithetical to 
the Nigerian chieftaincy in general. The constant attacks 
on the NA system by leaders such as Tafawa Balewa and 
other major opposition politicians lent credence to the 
undermining the institution of chieftaincy. The ruling 
Northern People’s Congress (NPC) pushed for the creation 
of a Ministry of Local Government and an elected premier 
solely to oversee the NAs. Thus the introduction of the 
Chiefs-in-Council system was part of the grand strategy 
to reduce the powers of the chiefs by both the British and 
Nigerian nationalists. Similarly, the vast system of District 
Officers, who were political appointees, subordinated 
chiefs to the Provincial Administrative Law. Thus, the 
authority to appoint or depose chiefs were vested in the 
hands of few politicians as was clearly happening in both 
the North and South. Perhaps the major nationalist attack 
on the Nigerian chieftaincy came from no other than Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo, a leading national politician, whose 
contempt for the institution stemmed from chiefs’ role as 
collaborators in the independence movement in the South 
(Adjaye & Misawa, 2006).
A colonial legacy which impacted on African 
politics is the administrative style of the colonizers. 
The colonizers ruled without the consent of the people: 
they deposed, exiled and executed traditional rulers, 
when the latter failed to implement the instructions of 
colonial administrators or failed to serve the need of 
the colonial government (Shillington, 1989, p.354-357; 
Hochschild, 1989). The ruling structure, which was based 
on the control by a few, through oppression and the use 
of force, laid a basis for patron-client rulership after 
colonialism. Following the disruption of the African pre-
colonial leadership form and the corresponding political 
culture, colonialism can be said to have set up structures 
and ruptured the dynamics and patterns which curtailed 
different and contradicting inter-ethnic relations and 
interests. According to John Lonsdale, the instrument of 
political control and economic allocation in African states 
had been violently constructed by outsiders, that is, the 
colonizers. (Lonsdale, 1986, p.126-157). Consequently, 
the new “bandwagons” of rulers, as Lonsdale describe 
them, did not see the need for discipline and responsibility 
in the constitution of political power but simply applied 
the principle of rewarding and absorbing the recruitment 
of supporters and civil servants: neo-patrimonial 
(Alemazung, 2010).
Colonial rule wiped out the dependency of the chief 
on his councilors, as was the case in pre-colonial rule, 
replacing this with autocracy and replacing the ruler’s 
dependence on the people to elite rulership which 
depended upon colonial superiors and later foreign powers 
(Nugent, 2004, p.107-108). Following the Eastern Region 
Local Government Ordinance of 1950, British law, as 
modified and applied to Nigeria, was the basis on which 
all cases were decided in theory (Scarritt, 1965, p.28). In 
practice, however:
Virtually the only cases which came before Native courts were 
tax and land disputes, many of them involving, inevitably, the 
authority for the colonial government. All other cases, including 
even some land disputes, were settled in traditional courts in 
accordance with customary standards. Because most cases did 
in fact concern local custom rather than colonial law, the British 
permitted the continuance of this practice. (Scarritt, 1965, p.28)
Indeed, the long history of Colonialism in Nigeria 
had a profound influence on the institution of chieftaincy. 
Presumably, this development was because the British 
colonial administration saw the institution and its core 
observance and rituals as antithetical to the ideals and 
objectives of good government. The social fabric was 
completely devastated and a new culture of violence 
was implanted. Traditional African systems of conflict 
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resolution were destroyed and, in their places, nothing 
was given. The democratic process, rudimentary though it 
was, but with great potential as accompanies every human 
institution, was brutally uprooted and replaced by the 
authoritarianism of colonialism. (Mimiko, 2010, p.641- 
642) This situation offer an explanation on the transition 
traditional institution of chieftaincy has undergone since 
the end of the nineteenth century. The next section thus 
takes a cursory look on how the institution of chieftaincy 
was affected in modern Bekwarra.
3.  MODERN BEKWARRA AND THE 
INSTITUTION OF CHIEFTAINCY 
In the decades that followed independence, African 
leaders worked to shape the cultural, political, and 
economic character of the postcolonial state. Some 
worked against the challenges of continued European 
cultural and political hegemony, while others worked with 
European powers in order to protect their interests and 
maintain control over economic and political resources. 
(Talton, 2011) The end of the colonial system of indirect 
rule created a dichotomy on the role of chiefs and their 
relations with the new African State. 
Many of Africa’s nationalist saw chiefs as functionaries 
of the colonial State and chieftaincy as an anachronistic 
vestige of the old Africa that had no place in the post-
colonial political landscape. These leaders, therefore, often 
pursued policies to Africanize the bureaucracy without 
indigenizing the institutions of governance. The new elite, 
which increasingly grew self-serving and autocratic, also 
could not tolerate the existence of contending points of 
power. Many African countries, attempted unsuccessfully 
to strip chiefs of most of their authority or even abolish 
chieftaincy altogether, in many other cases African 
leaders, attempted, with varying degrees of success, to co-
opt traditional leaders probably in an effort to enhance 
their own legitimacy. Despite these ambiguous efforts, 
chieftaincy has continued to operate with large numbers 
of adherents, especially in rural areas.
The precarious situation of chiefs in post independent 
Nigeria was determined earlier on by various ways of tight 
control, subordination, manipulation, removal from office, 
upgrading of status and salary increment, established 
and used by different Nigerian governments in dealing 
with the chiefs. Following the 1966 military intervention 
in politics, the position of chiefs was redefined in many 
ways, including directives controlling their activities, 
and the takeover of NAs, prisons and Native Courts by 
the state governments. In 1967, and subsequently on 
three other occasions, the military government of Nigeria 
created more states in the country, breaking the territorial 
domains of many chiefs and rendering them less important 
(Adjaye & Misawa, 2006).
The Nigeria-wide local government reform of 1976 
was formulated to ‘bring government closer to the 
people, and to strengthen the role of ‘Traditional rulers’ 
believed to be important ‘in the context of governance 
and development as well as to act as ‘the impartial fathers 
of their communities and custodians of traditional values. 
The 1976 Local Government Reforms gave more powers 
to local government council over traditional rulers and 
marked a watershed in the authority and powers of 
the chiefs since independence. The little semblance of 
executive authority they had was effectively removed 
under the reform process. It is fair to argue that the 
1976 Local Government Reforms laws were the final 
culmination of the loss of power of the chiefs in a long 
protracted battle against subordination and secularization. 
As a result, both public expectations and service delivery 
lay with the councilors and not with the chiefs.
In some instances, the “reform” process has involved 
the creation and imposition of new chiefs, thereby further 
weakening the institution. In reality what had happened is 
not the demise of the institution of chieftaincy but rather 
its transformation, processes that has accentuated rather 
than resolve ambiguities and ambivalence. As the Oba 
of Benin forcefully contended neither the First Republic 
nor the military regimes of 1966–79 provided much for 
chieftaincy in Nigeria. He maintained: “I think we may 
conveniently jump the period of the military regimes 
because there was nothing outstanding in the roles of 
traditional rulers in the administration of that period”. 
(Adjaye & Misawa, 2006) It is clear that over the past 120 
years, the independent political authority and autonomy 
of the chief in Nigeria have been virtually eliminated 
through a process of local government reform and judicial 
acts. The direct access of chiefs to local revenues has 
been seriously undermined as access to local revenues 
and taxation are now vested in local councils (Adjaye & 
Misawa, 2006).
In addition, the 1978 Land Use Decree (Decree No. 6 
of 1978) transferred control of land to the government at 
various levels, with the state and local councils exercising 
primary responsibilities instead of the chief. Similarly, 
while chiefs could be “upgraded” or promoted under the 
reform process, their steady loss of power and control 
over land as well as structures of local government has 
been significant. Also, a major provision relating to chiefs 
was the establishment of a State Council of Chiefs, in the 
1979 Nigerian constitution, which taking a cue from the 
colonialists, have seen the wisdom to carve an advisory 
role for traditional rulers in the governance of the Nigerian 
polity. This advisory role was not sacrosanct as their 
advice could be ignored or rejected by the government 
at any time (Adjaye & Misawa, 2006). The situation is 
thus somewhat paradoxical; although traditional leaders 
continue to play an important role in the life of the nation, 
their status in law is weakly defined, and existing laws are 
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outmoded and in no way consonant with what happens on 
a day-to-day basis (Omopariola, 1985, p.72).
During the pre-colonial era, chiefs were responsible 
for a great variety of disputes ranging from land disputes, 
to family issues and witchcraft within their jurisdiction, 
but this has virtually disappeared with the Courts Edict 
of 1967-8. Today chiefs appear to be complementary, if 
not rivals, to the administration of justice of the State. 
Mostly, but not always, they exercise these functions in 
the shadow of the State administration of justice. They 
also play the role of auxiliary in the local administration 
since colonial times. The administration has oftentimes 
manipulated chiefs with a view to reinforce state control 
or to exercise bureaucratic power. Since colonial days, 
they have mostly a limited competence in penal matters, 
but chiefs are still considered to be guards over the 
welfare of their people, not only by dealing with dispute 
settlement, but also through religious pleads to ensure 
social welfare and prosperity. All these activities help 
them to enjoy respect and maintain their authority.
The view is that at every level, the rights and 
responsibilities of traditional rulers, and by extension, 
kingmakers have been reduced by government. They 
no longer have the right to appoint, discipline or depose 
village heads, but only report to the government. They 
are banned from partisan politics. Traditional councils 
can no longer make traditional religious or administrative 
decisions or apply rules and procedures to execute policies 
coming from their traditions or religion. Traditional 
rulers are no longer rallying points for their communities. 
The federal and state government’s control traditional 
rulers at all levels: from village chief to the clan, they 
are appointed or elected with great “interference” either 
directly or indirectly by the government (Omopariola, 
1985, p.72). Political interference with traditional 
institutions is a source of concern because traditional 
rulers as appointees of government are tied to the apron 
or strings of government. A source of significant debate 
is the fact that the rampant elevation of chiefs to higher 
classes and status, the arbitrary creation of new chiefs, 
their deposition and dethronement, and the indiscriminate 
acquisition of chieftaincy titles by political elites have 
affected even the functioning of governments at all levels. 
It is ironic that chiefs are viewed only as important when 
it suits the interests of the political class (Omopariola, 
1985, p.72).
Another markedly different picture emerges from the 
perception of chieftaincy position which in the past has 
been seen with distrust and fear. Cases were rife of people 
absconding for fear of the diverse responsibilities of the 
office. One of such responsibilities that made individuals 
abhor the position was one which seldom exists now. This 
responsibility, it was believed, required a chief to sacrifice 
seven of his relations who would have to die mysterious 
circumstances. Though this requirement has been revoked, 
the institution is still viewed with deep suspicion. It 
was also held that once a man is crowned as a chief his 
personal freedom was greatly restricted. In addition, he 
was banned from engaging in economic activities like 
farming, trading, hunting among others. Again, it was 
considered an abomination for the chief to be seen in 
the market. Besides, a chief was prohibited from seeing 
his parents if they still lived. And because it was an 
abomination for a chief to see a corpse on the event of 
their death he could never see their corpse. It was because 
of these responsibilities that were associated with the 
position that made chieftaincy position quite unattractive. 
In Bekwarra today, there is a paradigm shift as we find 
an increasing number of educated people accepting and 
even desperately seeking for chiefly positions. This is 
however, not peculiar to Bekwarra because today, many 
prominent Nigerians including serving and past political 
leaders hold one title or another―either traditional, 
educational, professional or religious. And the trend for 
acquiring titles is not limited to the political elite. There 
is an increasing appeal in chieftaincy today, even to 
outsiders and non-Africans (Omopariola, 1985, p.72). 
This shift has tended towards materialism, a move away 
from predominant metaphysical tendencies that carries 
moral truth, which was dominant in the earlier periods, 
and this is a reflection of cash economy of contemporary 
times, which has equally affected rural economy and 
life style. More so, as the monetization of politics from 
the national, state, to the local government levels has 
become a common trend in modern Nigerian society, this 
has reverberating and snowballing effects on the local 
communities (Ukpokolo, 2009, pp.9-10). The implication 
is that Bekwarra like most groups in Nigeria, seems to 
inclined chieftaincy titles in contemporary times than ever 
before, and this is reflected in title names. Hence, such 
title names as Adah Ebekwarra (Father of Bekwarra), 
Eshi Ke Beni (The Peoples bread winner), and Ugaba 1 of 
Bekwarra among other titles are replete in contemporary 
Bekwarra society. This craze for chieftaincy titles may 
be eroding what was once a highly revered position in 
traditional Nigerian society. 
In the past, it is hard to determine what the true income 
of traditional leaders was. The amount that a ruler can 
generate from legitimate sources of income depends 
strongly on the respect in which they are held by the local 
population. If that respect is high, then they will work 
on his farm or otherwise carry out civil works. Almost 
all rulers engage in agriculture and some have very 
large farms. Indeed the profits to be made from farming 
effectively are such that in some cases this has led to 
misappropriation of land, something a traditional leader is 
well-placed to do (Ukpokolo, 2009, p.71)
It is clear, however, that although in modern times, 
their official income depends on monthly allowance from 
government; traditional rulers also derive income for 
awarding chieftaincy titles. Indeed there is competition 
for local titles and the ruler can expect recompense for 
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awarding these. The payment of money for a traditional 
title in Nigeria is common knowledge. Because such 
conferment enhances the social mobility of individuals 
within the society, individuals are always ready to pay so 
much. Omopariola (1985) has suggested this as a service 
a traditional ruler can offer on a commercial basis to 
generate income. This could be compared to eighteenth 
century England, where titles such as Baronetcy could be 
bought for fixed sums. Even in present-day Britain, large 
donors to political parties expect a title to be conferred in 
due course, while avoiding an obvious public equivalence 
between payment and that title (Omopariola, 1985, p.71).
Rather more shakily, but again in line with practice 
in developed countries, is the award of contracts to the 
traditional leaders. If the local government has a good 
rapport with the local leader and perceives the need for 
further subventions for them to carry out their duties it is 
possible to direct contracts towards them. These may be 
for construction, supply of goods and services and so on. 
Clearly this is undesirable since the local leader may well 
not be the best value contractor, but this probably works 
better in Nigeria than elsewhere where all contractors 
have corrupt relationships with those who award contracts 
(Omopariola, 1985, p.71). Today chiefs are widely 
criticized for corruption and bribery. More problematic 
still are anecdotal accounts of bribery and illegal 
payments for clandestine services. For example, in areas 
where there have been conflicts over land and local chiefs 
have been accused of taking bribe to favor one of the 
parties involved. Indeed, customary justice is sometimes 
a tense area, with both parties accusing the chief of taking 
bribes. The truth of accusations in individual cases is 
hard to determine, but it is certain that such payments are 
sometimes made (Omopariola, 1985, p.201). These leaders 
have become an ideal example of corruption, general 
insecurity, crimes, and sometimes inciting communal 
feuds. Indeed, Nigerian dailies today, are replete with 
reports of contestations about chieftaincy successions, 
allegations of wrongdoings on the part of chiefs, and of 
incidents of violence attributable to animosities on the 
part contesting parties to chiefly positions.
Chiefs, in addition to their main role as intermediaries 
between their community and the government, articulate 
the interests and concerns of their people, acts as advisers 
to the government. In view of their importance, traditional 
rulers had constitutional role in the 1960 and 1963 
constitutions. These constitutions had provisions for a 
Council of Chiefs in the regions and some of them were 
even regional governors. In addition, the 1979 Constitution 
gave them representation in the National Council of State. 
Lamentably, there is no prescribed role for traditional 
rulers in the 1999 constitution (Nworah, 2007).
Chieftaincy has undergone significant transformation 
since the last century and thus finds itself in a dilemma 
as chiefs are trapped in their relationship with those who 
wield State power and have a hard time breaking free, so, 
they end up getting involved in politics. Chiefs have been 
actively vying for new political space within the context 
of the African State, articulating such claims that they are 
the “true representatives of the people” (Van Rouveroy 
van Nieuwaal, 1996, pp.39-78). Available reports from the 
print and electronic media suggest that all over Nigeria, 
monarchs are deeply involved in partisan politics, a 
clear indication that they have not learnt from lessons 
of the past. The familiar story is either that a traditional 
ruler is taking sides with one politician or at loggerheads 
with another. Monarchs openly join forces as opposition 
against some political elements in their domains.
Most disturbing, however, is the case of monarch 
who openly endorses candidates. Although traditional 
rulers in Bekwarra and other parts of Nigeria reserve 
the fundamental freedom of expression as enshrined in 
the Nigerian Constitution, they are, nonetheless, only 
expected to be seen―not heard―on issues regarding 
partisan politics so that they do not get into troubled 
waters. Monarchs are expected to be neutral while 
receiving politicians who come to pay homage during 
electioneering campaigns. The result has never been 
pleasant. But the present crop of monarchs seems to be 
oblivious of the fact that, though theirs appear to be the 
most precarious position in the Nigerian socio-cultural 
terrain, they could still be easily removed from office. 
(allAfrica.com, 2011).
The military regime under General Muhammadu 
Buhari (1984-1985), after having alienated many other 
interest groups by its autocratic and repressive political 
style, strengthened the position of traditional rulers, not 
the least as a counterweight against more radical political 
tendencies. Councils of Chiefs were created on the level 
of the States. Under General Ibrahim Babangida’s rule 
(1985-1993) ex-politicians and Traditional Rulers from 
the old Eastern Region even formed a lobby group to 
advance the “eastern interest”. In contrast, the Political 
Bureau (1986-88), set up by Babangida to discuss a future 
political system, wanted to keep Traditional Rulers out 
of formal positions in local administration (Vaughan 
1997, p.418-427). In spite of this contrast, as Vaughan 
(1997, p.427-429) has argued, it would be misleading to 
construct an outright opposition between conservative 
“neotraditionalists” supporting the military government of 
General Sani Abacha (1993-1998), and liberal intellectuals 
and businessmen opposed to it. In practice, Traditional 
Rulers as well as considerable parts of the “political 
class” have been manipulated into supporting the military 
regime. (Harneit-Sievers, 1998, p.57-70).
A thorny issue relates to how successive military 
governments since 1983 have relied on traditional support 
for their own legitimacy. The trend since the 1970s has 
been for government to use traditional rulers to legitimize 
their power. This practice expanded into outright 
manipulation under the military regime of General Sani 
Abacha. For instance, in early 1998, traditional rulers 
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all over the country converged at Abuja. Here they were 
made to watch video clips which allegedly proved the 
involvement of a number of senior military officers 
in a coup attempt against the incumbent government. 
After being shown the videos, and before a military 
tribunal tried the culprits to prove their guilt or innocence 
traditional rulers (with a few exceptions) publicly declared 
that the officers detained were indeed guilty of the alleged 
offence (Adegbulu, 2011).
Since the colonial era, chiefs have been dependent 
on the central government for recognition of their 
legitimacy as representatives of their people as well as 
for obtaining economic and political favors in the interest 
of the people they represent. In the intricate and delicate 
power struggle between the local and central authority 
traditional rulers have gradually witnessed the erosion of 
their powers. A particular trend from the 1990s onwards 
has been the widespread upgrading and creation of 
chieftaincies either to reinforce ethnic agendas or to 
reward wealthy political donors. As a result, the position 
of these ‘new’ chiefs is regarded with skepticism by 
the general population and they do not command the 
allegiance essential to effective functioning. The sheer 
numbers of recently created chiefs inevitably contributes 
to the dilution of the authority of traditional chiefs as 
well as reducing the extent of their domains.(Blench, 
Longtau, Hassan, & Walsh, 2006, p.iii). In pre-colonial 
times, chiefs played a greater role in handling high-
profile court cases within their jurisdiction, but this has 
virtually disappeared with the Courts Edict of 1967-8. 
The role of traditional rulers is thus most prominent in 
settling family matters, cases of witchcraft, land disputes 
and religious disputes (Omopariola, 1985, p.78).
Although chiefs serve as repositories of local 
history and spirituality, upholders of local values and 
symbolize pride in history, at every level, the rights and 
responsibilities of traditional rulers, and by extension, 
kingmakers have been reduced by government. They 
no longer have the right to appoint, discipline or depose 
village heads but only report to the government. In 
addition Traditional leaders can no longer make traditional 
religious or administrative decisions or apply rules 
and procedures to execute policies coming from their 
traditions or religion. Indeed, Traditional rulers are no 
longer rallying points for their communities (Omopariola, 
1985, p.78). According to Nworah, some of the key issues 
that have contributed to the waning influence of the 
traditional institution are either self-inflicted or caused by 
globalisation and coupled with the dwindling economic 
fortunes that have eroded their influence and authority, a 
situation where traditional rulers depend on government 
for survival (Nworah, 2007).
CONCLUSION
Chiefs commanded a great deal of autonomy and were 
responsible for the maintenance of good order in his 
state. He is guardian of the fundamental values of his 
people, mediated between them and was the final arbiter 
in the administration of justice. As rallying points 
for development in the community he retained legal 
powers and authority over land allocation as well as 
local taxation, administered tributes, court fines, market 
tolls, and other revenues. Through a chief’s office, his 
subjects were mobilized to assist in projects that position 
the community into serving the needs of its member’s 
well-being. Even in its weakened state, past and present 
governments recognize traditional leaders as important 
agents of development, especially at the local level. 
It is interesting to note that the so-called negative 
characteristics of chieftaincy which make the institution 
repulsive to its detractors are rather ironically present in 
any system of governance in the orbit of either Western 
or Eastern ideology. For instance, the issue of hierarchy, 
which was evidently necessary as a means to maintain 
order and stability in traditional society, is not peculiar to 
chieftaincy, but rather present in any governance system. 
In his observation of American democracy, the sociologist 
C Wright Mills, made it clear that the major decisions in 
that society are made by a few overlapping interests and 
not by the majority of people as their brand of democracy 
will have us believe (Seleke, 2010).
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